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At the start of December, President Trump convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to long-standing fighting in the turbulent eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Shift in Policy

This contrast encapsulates the core tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—though how this fits with the nascent military strikes in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative reinforced this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This pivot is significant, but analysts caution it is early to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Apathy and Strains

Unlike his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Selective Intervention

A comparable confrontation flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have pushed the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.